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DEMORE v. KIM: UPHOLDING THE
UNNECESSARY DETAINMENT OF LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS
Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Demore v. Kim,1 the Supreme Court of the United States held that
Congress did not offend due process rights under the Fifth Amendment in
requiring that criminal aliens awaiting their removal hearings be detained
pursuant to the no-bail provision of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA)
(8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). The Court further held that the provision of the INA
limiting judicial review of the Attorney General's discretion for the
detention or release of criminal aliens did not preclude the Court of
jurisdiction to grant habeas relief.2 The Court considered the habeas corpus
petition filed by a lawful permanent resident (LPR) detained by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 3  The habeas petition
challenged the no-bail provision of the INA.4
This Note argues several reasons why the Supreme Court's ruling was
erroneous. First, the Court's decision in Demore is inconsistent with its
recent decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that aliens under final orders of
removal may not be detained indefinitely, but only for a period reasonably
necessary to secure the alien's removal.' As in Zadvydas, the government
has not proffered a sufficiently strong justification for the blanket
mandatory detention of criminal aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
Furthermore, the Demore decision achieves the absurd result of providing
more protection for the liberty of aliens already ordered deported than for
those who have not yet been stripped of their right to remain in the United
States. Second, Demore undermines the high status reserved for LPRs in
the United States. Those criminal aliens who would be most appropriate for
1 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1721-22 (2003).
2 Id. at 1714.
3 Id. at 1713.
4 Id.
' 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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release pending their removal hearing are those with the strongest familial
and community ties. Finally, the purpose of § 1226(c) is to ensure that
criminal aliens appear for their removal proceedings.6 The statute was
passed in response to the severe inefficiencies and shortage of resources
plaguing the INS, which largely contributed to a low percentage of non-
detained criminal aliens appearing for their removal proceedings.7 In
finding that the government had a reasonable justification for mandatory
detention of criminal aliens, the Court supported the restriction of
individual liberties as a solution to government incompetence. Given the
current reorganization in the United States immigration departments, it is an
opportune time for Congress to restructure this removal process in order to
safeguard the rights of lawful permanent aliens.
II. BACKGROUND
A. LAWS GOVERNING CRIMINAL ALIENS
1. History of Immigration Law in the United States
For a large part of this country's history, there has been neither a
comprehensive body of immigration law nor laws specifically governing
criminal aliens.8 The first general immigration statute of 1882 barred
immigration of "undesirable" aliens including convicts and mentally
impaired individuals, but did not include a provision for the removal of
aliens who committed crimes after entering the United States.9 Restrictive
immigration legislation was passed in 1917 and 1924 providing criminal
grounds for deportation.'
0
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) recodified and
revised the immigration laws." The INA augmented federal authority to
remove certain criminal aliens and identified "crimes of moral turpitude"' 12
6 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1720.
7 Id. at 1715.
8 S. REP. No. 104-48, at 10 (1995).
9 Id.; see 22 Stat. 214-215 (1882).
'0 S. REP. No. 104-48, at 10; see S. REP. No. 64-352 (1916) (allowing for deportation of
aliens committing "serious crimes" within the first five years of their entry).
" S. REP. No. 104-48, at 11; see Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(2000).
12 S. REP. No. 104-48, at 11 n.24 (such crimes are defined by state law and include
murder, manslaughter, rape and sodomy).
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as acts that could give rise to deportation.13  However, until 198814 all
persons facing deportation were entitled to a bond hearing.
15
In recent years, Congress has gradually limited the discretionary relief
available to aggravated felons subject to deportation. 16 The culmination of
this movement occurred with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 17 The IIRIRA
amended and reformed the INA and other immigration laws. 18 In addition
to expediting removal of aliens arriving at ports with improper or fraudulent
documents, the lIRIRA increased detention requirements for classes of
aliens such as those involved in criminal, terrorist, or drug trafficking
activities.' 9 Congress also eliminated the discretion to release criminal
aliens on bond, mandating the detention of virtually all such aliens.2°
Section 1226(c) of the IIRIRA, entitled "Detention of Criminal
Aliens," sets out the guidelines for the detention of criminal aliens pending
removal hearings. Section 1226(c) provides in relevant part:
(1) Custody. The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who-
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227
(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense
for which the alien has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
(2) Release. The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1)
only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of Title 18 that release
of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential
witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an
immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person
cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General
that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of the property
13 Id. at 11.
14 In 1988, Congress amended the INA as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
establishing a new category of deportable alien, the aggravated felon. See id. at 11; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).
15 Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 304 (3d Cir. 2001).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 304-05; see PUB. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
18 EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS Div., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S REMOVAL OF ALIENS ISSUED FINAL ORDERS 1-2003-004, at 8
(2003).
19 Id.
20 See PUB. L. No. 104-208, § 303; BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION INFORMATION, IMMIGRATION DETENTION
FACILITIES, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/fieldoffices/detention/index.htm (last
modified June 5, 2003).
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and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such
release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of
the offense committed by the alien.
2 1
The convictions that trigger § 1226(c) include: (1) any "aggravated
felony;, 22 (2) any two crimes involving moral turpitude committed at any
time, regardless of the imposed sentence; 23 and (3) any single crime
involving moral turpitude if it occurs within five years of the alien's
admission into the United States when the term of imprisonment is at least
one year.24 An aggravated felony includes: (1) murder, rape, sexual abuse
of a minor; (2) firearms or controlled substance trafficking; (3) a crime of
violence with a prison term of at least one year; (4) theft or burglary with a
sentence of at least one year; (5) fraud exceeding $10,000; or (6) offenses
relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or bribery with a sentence of at
least one year.
25
Further, the Attorney General's "discretionary judgment regarding the
application of this section shall not be subject to review., 26 A court may
not set aside determinations by the Attorney General pursuant to this
section regarding bond or parole or the detention or release of any alien.27
The statute provides the Attorney General with the discretion to release an
alien only when the alien's release is indispensable to the protection of a
witness, potential witness, or a person assisting in a criminal investigation,
and if the alien does not pose a threat to society or a flight risk. 28 The
statute does not impart authority to the Attorney General to release criminal
aliens during their removal proceeding solely based upon a determination
that a criminal alien does not present a risk of flight or threat to the
community.29
2. Federal Treatment of Immigration and Terrorism
In recent years, both Congress and the Executive Branch have made
specific developments in response to the threat imposed by terrorism. The
dissent in Demore30 highlighted the statutory provisions representing the
21 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000).
12 Id. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).21 Id. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
23 Id. §§ 1226(c)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(I).
25 Id. § 1101(a)(43).
26 Id. § 1226(e).
27 Id.
28 See id. § 1226(c)(2).
29 Patel v. Zamski, 275 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2001).




procedures for removal of alien terrorists. 3' The statute permits the
Attorney General to take into custody and detain any alien thought to be
participating in terrorist activity. 32  Significantly, the statute explicitly
provides special rules for permanent resident aliens awaiting removal
hearings.33 Such aliens are allowed a release hearing to consider their flight
risk and threat to the community.
34
On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush abolished the INS
and transferred its responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security in
the Homeland Security Act. 35 The enforcement functions of the INS were
transferred into the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, and the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) was established
to carry out the immigration and customs laws of the United States. 36 One
of the functions of BICE is to identify, apprehend, and remove criminal
aliens.37 The transition of enforcement functions into BICE has been
occurring in phases and is incomplete to date. 38 The ramifications of the
reorganization, therefore, are still unknown.
B. SUPREME COURT RULES IN ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS TO PROTECT DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER FINAL ORDER OF REMOVAL
1. Background of Zadvydas v. Davis
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,39 considered the writs of
habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by two criminal aliens
challenging their continued detainment by the INS.40  The aliens were
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(2), which requires the detention of
aliens under final orders of removal during a ninety-day removal period.4'
The INS had detained both aliens for periods longer than the ninety-day
requirement.42 The Court refused to allow the Attorney General to hold
3 ' 8 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
32 Id.
33 Id.
14 Id. § 1536(2)(A).




39 Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburg.
40 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
41 Id. at 683.
42 Id. at 684-86.
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aliens indefinitely and decided aliens may only be detained for a period
reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal.43
The Court reviewed the due process rights of criminal aliens, finding
protection of freedom from imprisonment unless detention is ordered in
criminal proceedings with adequate procedural safeguards, or in civil
proceedings where there is a special justification. 4 The Due Process
Clause protects all aliens who have entered the United States, whether their
presence is temporary, permanent, lawful or unlawful.45 When an alien is
under a final order of removal, the government seeks to execute the
deportation during a ninety-day statutory removal period, during which
time the alien must be held in custody. 6 If the alien is detained beyond the
ninety-day removal period, an INS panel will review the matter to
determine whether custody should be relinquished. 7 In order to release an
alien detained beyond the removal period, the panel must find that the alien
is unlikely to be violent or pose a threat to the community, to flee, or to
violate the conditions of release.48
2. Whether Mandatory Detainment of Aliens Under § 2241 Fits with the
Purpose of that Act
The detention of aliens under a final order of removal is civil and non-
punitive in purpose, therefore requiring a "sufficiently strong special
justification. ' 49 The two regulatory goals cited by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 include
"ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings" and
"preventing danger to the community."50 The Court refuted the relevance
of these justifications in the case of aliens after a ninety-day removal
period."1
41 Id. at 682.
44 Id. at 690 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
45 Id. at 693 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-98 (1953); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
46 Id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(2) (Supp. 1994)).
47 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(i) (2001)).
48 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e)&(f) (2001)) (factors contributing to the panel's decision
include "the alien's disciplinary record, criminal record, mental health reports, evidence of
rehabilitation, history of flight, prior immigration history, and favorable factors such as
family ties").
49 Id. at 690.





The court hearing a habeas claim must ask whether the detention in
question serves the basic statutory aim, which is to assure the alien's
presence at the time of removal.52 If the detention is unreasonable53 and
thus not authorized by the statute, then "of course, the alien's release may
and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release
that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be
returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions. 54 If it appears
reasonably foreseeable that the alien will be removed, the habeas court
should then consider whether the detention is necessary based on a risk of
the alien committing further crimes within the reasonable removal period.5
Thus, if after a six month period, an alien under final orders of removal
indicates that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the government must counter with evidence sufficient to
deny that demonstration.56
3. Zadvydas Dissent Considers Due Process Rights of Aliens Under a Final
Order of Removal
Justice Kennedy's dissent57 detailed the rights conferred upon an alien
after entering the United States. 58 When threatened with deportation, an
admitted alien is entitled to a fair hearing.59 Until a removal hearing occurs
and a deportation order is entered, an alien maintains an interest in
remaining in the country by virtue of his continued existence.6° Such an
alien is also entitled to be free from either capricious or arbitrary
confinement.6' If an alien is detained in order to secure his removal, the
government can neither justify nor design the confinement as punishment.62
52 Id. at 699.
53 One example is when an alien's removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 699-700.
54 id.
" Id. at 700.
56 Id. at 701.
57 Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined,
and in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined as to Part I. Justice Scalia also filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.
58 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mizei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953)) ("Aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may
be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law ... ").
60 Id. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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It is "neither arbitrary nor capricious" to detain aliens when necessary
to prevent flight or threat to the community.63 The dissent stated that:
[w]hether a due process right is denied when removable aliens who are flight risks or
dangers to the community are detained turns, then, not on the substantive right to be
free, but on whether there are adequate procedures to review their cases, allowing
persons once subject to detention to show that through rehabilitation, new
appreciation of their responsibilities, or under other standards, they no longer present
special risks or danger if put at large.
64
The dissent then reviewed the procedures in place for review of the
confinement of aliens under a final order of removal, finding them adequate
to preserve due process rights. 65  Although the dissent affirmed the
established judicial review process in such situations, it cautioned that
"[w]ere the INS, in an arbitrary or categorical manner, to deny an alien
access to the administrative processes in place to review continued
detention, habeas jurisdiction would lie to redress the due process violation
caused by the denial of the mandated procedures under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4
(2001)."66
C. APPELLATE COURTS APPLY ZAD VYDAS TO CASES OF ALIEN
SPENDING REMOVAL HEARINGS
In a pre-Zadvydas decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that an alien 67 could be detained under § 1226(c) as he
awaited a removal hearing without violating his constitutional rights. 68 The
court appeared to give great weight to the fact that the alien conceded all
elements required for his removal, and thus was no longer entitled to remain
63 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 722-23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Factors to consider in the recommendation of
release or further confinement include:
"[t]he nature and number of disciplinary infractions"; "the detainee's criminal conduct and
criminal convictions, including consideration of the nature and severity of the alien's
convictions, sentences imposed and the time actually served, probation and criminal parole
history, evidence of recidivism, and other .criminal history"; "psychiatric and psychological
reports pertaining to the detainee's mental health"; "[e]vidence of rehabilitation"; "[flavorable
factors, including ties to the United States such as the number of close relatives"; "[p]rior
immigration violations and history"; "[t]he likelihood that the alien is a significant flight risk or
may abscond to avoid removal, including history of escapes"; and any other probative
information.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(f) (2001)).
6 Id. at 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67 The alien had been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault.
68 Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999).
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in the United States.69  The court further indicated that the alien could
choose to withdraw his defense of the removal proceeding and return to his
native land immediately.7 °  However, a criminal alien choosing to
"postpone the inevitable" had no constitutional right to remain unconfined
during the resulting delay, and the United States had a substantial interest in
detaining the alien so as to ensure his removal.7'
After the Zadvydas ruling, however, three appellate courts applied the
decision to require individualized bond hearings for criminal aliens being
detained prior to a removal determination.72 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit compared the detention of aliens under a final order of
removal, as considered in Zadvydas, with aliens detained prior to a removal
hearing. 73 The Third Circuit stated that although the pre-removal hearing
detention may not be indefinite, it is often lengthy.74 The appellate court
observed that the appellant,75 while awaiting a removal hearing, had been
confined for eleven months, six months more than his prison term for the
original offense and five months longer than the six-month period the
Supreme Court accepted as reasonable for detainees ordered removed.76
Although the Zadvydas Court did not address the constitutionality of
confinement prior to a removal determination, the Third Circuit believed
that the Court's reasoning could be applied to such a situation.77
The appellate courts determined that because § 1226(c) implicated the
aliens' fundamental right to be free from physical limitation, a court must
"apply heightened due process scrutiny to determine if the statute's
infringement on that right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."78 Governmental detainment in a non-criminal proceeding violates
the Due Process Clause unless a special justification in a non-criminal
proceeding outweighs the individual's constitutional right to be free from
69 Id. at 958.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247
(10th Cir. 2002); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001).
71 Patel, 275 F.3d at 309.
74 Id.
75 The appellant was "convicted of a non-violent offense, retains the possibility of relief
from deportation, and contests the classification of his offense as an aggravated felony, a
challenge that could render removal improper," Id. at 314.
76 Id. at 309.
77 id.
78 Id. at 310 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)); see also Hoang v.
Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1258 (10th Cir. 2002).
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physical restraint.79 Congress did not anticipate § 1226(c) detainment to be
penalizing, but cited two non-punitive purposes of protecting the
community from danger, and preventing flight risk.8°
Section 1226(c) establishes an "irrebutable presumption" that every
alien subject to deportation under the statute represents a flight risk or threat
to the community. 81 Even if many of the aliens under § 1226 would fall
within these two categories, those aliens who would not present a danger
and would obediently report to the proceedings would be deprived of their
fundamental right to freedom.82 Therefore, depriving individuals of such a
fundamental right does not promote any governmental goal.83
Moreover, the Third Circuit commented that shortly after the INS
takes custody of an alien, the alien is permitted a hearing before an
immigration judge to ascertain whether he or she is an aggravated felon
pursuant to § 1226(c).84 The court discovered no reason that such a hearing
could not incorporate an evaluation of flight risk and danger, thereby
affording the alien a less restrictive means to the attainment of the
government's goals.
8 5
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS
Respondent Hyung Joon Kim is a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of
the United States. 6 Kim entered the United States legally in 1984 at the
age of six, and became a LPR in 1986.87 Kim is a native and citizen of the
Republic of Korea (South Korea).88 Kim's mother is a United States citizen
and his father and brother are LPRs. 9
A California state court convicted Kim of first degree burglary of a
toolshed in 1996.90 He was sentenced to five years' probation and 180 days
79 Hoang, 282 F.3d at 1258.
80 id.
81 Id. at 1259; Patel, 275 F.3d at 311.




86 Brief for the Respondent at 8, Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003) (No. 01-1491).
87 Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003) (No. 01-1491).
88 Id.




in jail (of which 117 were suspended). 91 In 1997, Kim was convicted of
"petty theft with priors" and received a sentence of three years'
imprisonment. 92 Kim was released after serving less than two years of his
sentence. 93 The INS did not initiate the removal proceedings against Kim
while he was serving his criminal sentence, but waited until the day after he
was released from prison.
94
The INS arrested and detained Kim at the county jail.95 As provided
by § 1226(c), the INS declined to consider Kim's release on bond.96 The
INS charged Kim as deportable, characterizing his 1997 petty theft
conviction as an aggravated felony.97 However, the INS did not formally
begin removal proceedings against Kim until March 10, 1999, five weeks
after his arrest and detention.98
In May 1999, after more than three months in INS detention, and while
awaiting his first substantive hearing before an immigration judge, Kim
filed a habeas corpus petition. 99  In the petition, Kim challenged the
constitutionality of his mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c).'0°
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 1999, the district court declared § 1226(c) unconstitutional
and ordered the government to conduct an individualized bond hearing.' 0 '
The Attorney General did not request a stay of the district court's order, nor
contested Kim's release on bond.10 2 In fact, the INS released Kim on $5000
bond after determining that he was not a threat or significant flight risk.10 3
This determination came five days after the district court's mandate, and
more than six months after Kim was taken into INS custody. 10 4
The INS appealed the decision of the district court to the United States











101 Id.; see Kim v. Schiltgen, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
102 Brief for the Respondent at 9, Demore, (No. 01-1491).
.03 Id. at 10.
104 Id. at 9.
'o' 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001).
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overturned the district court's finding that § 1226 was unconstitutional on
its face. 10 6 The appeals court found that the statute could be constitutionally
applied in certain situations, for example to those who have not yet
"entered" the United States.'0 7 The Ninth Circuit nonetheless concluded
that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to LPRs. 0 8 The appeals
court affirmed the lower court's grant of habeas corpus relief to Kim as a
LPR alien. 109 The court recognized the rights of LPRs to work, reside
peimanently, and apply for citizenship."0  Significantly, the Ninth Circuit
viewed these rights as guaranteed until a final administrative order of
removal was entered against a LPR."'
The Ninth Circuit observed that the statute in question is "civil and
regulatory, not criminal or punitive."' 12 In accordance with Zadvydas, the
court analyzed whether the government provided a sufficiently strong
justification for the civil detention of a LPR alien." 3 The court rejected two
of the government's rationales for detaining Kim without an individual bail
hearing. 1
4
First, the Ninth Circuit challenged that Kim and other LPRs must be
detained in order to assure their proper removal from the United States."
15
Second, given the variety of crimes falling under the classification of
aggravated felonies, the government could not demonstrate that § 1226(c)
covers only aliens that are dangerous to the public." 6 The appeals court
followed the reasoning of the majority in Zadvydas to conclude that the
government did not propose a special justification for the detainment of
Kim. " 7 The statute could not pass constitutional muster in the case of Kim
or other similarly situated LPRs. 118 Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, Kim, as a LPR, was entitled to "a bail hearing with
reasonable promptness to determine whether the alien is a flight risk or a
danger to the community."" 9
'06 Id. at 527.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 539.
'09 Id. at 528.
110 Id.
.. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p)).
112 Id. at 530.
113 Id.
"14 Id. at 531-34.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 535-37.
118 Id. at 538.
"19 Id. at 539.
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C. SUPREME COURT CASE
*The INS filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court. The Court granted a writ for certiorari. 120 Upon certiorari, the Court
considered two issues: (1) whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) deprives the Court
from jurisdiction to hear the case; and (2) the constitutionality of mandatory
detention during removal proceedings for the class of deportable aliens
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
On June 6, 2002, after Kim filed his Brief in Opposition with the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that a conviction for "petty theft with
priors" pursuant to the same California statute under which Kim was
convicted in 1997 did not qualify as an aggravated felony pursuant to the
INA. 12 1 Ten weeks after the ruling, the INS modified the immigration
charges against Kim to include his 1996 conviction and add a new ground
for deportation.122 The amended claim alleged that Kim's 1996 and 1997
convictions together constituted "convict[ions] of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal
misconduct."'' 23 Thus, Kim remained subject to deportation on the basis of
committing crimes of moral turpitude, which is also a basis for mandatory
detention under § 1226(c).124
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
1. The Court Found it had Jurisdiction to Review the Respondent's Claim
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist12 5 reversed the Ninth
Circuit's decision and held that Kim's claim must fail. 26 The Court first
120 Demore v. Kim, 536 U.S. 956 (2002).
121 Brief for the Respondent at 11, Demore (No. 01-1491) (citing United States v.
Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002)).
122 Brief for the Petitioners at 3 n.2, Demore (No. 01-1491).
123 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)).
124 Brief for the Respondent at 11, Demore (No. 01-1491).
125 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justice Kennedy. Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined as to Part I, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined
in all but Part I. Justice Kennedy concurred in the opinion, asserting that if INS removal
procedures were found to have unreasonable delay, then constitutionality would potentially
be in question. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurred in part
and concurred, agreeing with decision on the merits, but disagreeing that the Court has
jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenge.
126 Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1722 (2003).
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determined that it had the jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to Kim's
constitutional challenge of detention under § 1226(c).127 The Court relied
on its precedent requiring Congress to clearly convey when it intends to
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims.128 Because § 1226(e) does
not contain a provision clearly barring habeas review, the plain text did not
prohibit Kim's constitutional challenge to the legislation sanctioning his
detention without bail.
29
2. The Court Considered the State of Immigration in the United States at
the Time of the Passage of§ 1226(c)
The Court considered the substantive claim presented by Kim
contesting the § 1226(c) mandatory detention of certain deportable aliens
throughout their removal proceedings.' 30 The Court initially examined the
backdrop against which Congress adopted § 1226, referencing the 1995
congressional hearings regarding criminal aliens in the United States.'
31
For example, at the time that Congress passed the legislation, criminal
aliens were the fastest growing group of prisoners in federal prison
populations, as well as a rapidly rising proportion of state prison
populations.' 32 A Congressional investigation uncovered that the INS could
not even identify most removable aliens, much less locate them and deport
them from the country. 133 Additionally, the inquiry revealed that criminal
aliens who had been deported "swiftly" returned to the United States
illegally in large numbers.
34
The Court also reviewed statistics that Congress considered prior to
the enactment of § 1226(c), indicating that over twenty percent of the
released deportable criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal
hearings, and often committed more crimes before being deported. 35
During this period reflected in the data, the Attorney General had broad
discretion to conduct individualized bond hearings and could release
criminal aliens from custody if determined that they were neither flight
127 Id. at 1713-14.
12I d. at 1714 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1714-15 (citing Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearings before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, 103rd Cong. (1993); S. REP. No. 104-48, at 1 (1995)).
132 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 104-48, at 6-9).
113 Id. at 1715 (citing S. REP. No. 104-48, at 1).
134 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 104-48, at 2).
135 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 104-48, at 2-3).
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risks nor dangers to society. 36 In practice, the decisions of the INS to
release criminal aliens were impacted by the severe deficiencies facing the
INS in its funding and detention space. 3 7 Moreover, the Attorney General
did not consistently provide individualized bond hearings for each
criminal138
3. The Court Assessed Recent Changes in the Immigration Law
The Court appraised the changes in immigration law since the end of
the 1980s.139 In 1988, Congress restricted the Attorney General's discretion
in detention decisions regarding removable aliens who had been convicted
of aggravated felonies.1 40 In 1990, Congress broadened the definition of
"aggravated felony," resulting in the detention of more criminal aliens. 14'
At the same time, however, Congress passed a provision 42 granting the
Attorney General leave to release LPRs during the deportation proceedings
if he or she found that the LPRs were not a likely flight risk or danger to the
community. 43 Then, following the reports showing that detention during
deportation proceedings might best ensure that criminal aliens be
successfully removed from the country, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1226,
requiring the Attorney General to detain deportable criminal aliens while
they awaited the determination of their removability. 44 The Court voiced
its support of the proposition that "Congress may make rules as to aliens
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.' 45
4. The Court's Evaluation of Relevant Precedent
i. Opinions Rejecting Due Process Violation Claims
In its discussion of Fifth Amendment due process rights, the Court first
set out that Kim did not dispute whether he was "deportable" within the
136 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982)).
137 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 104-48, at 23) ("[R]elease determinations are made by the INS
in large part, according to the number of beds available in a particular region.").
138 Id. (citing Brief for the Petitioners at 19, Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003) (No.
01-1491)). "[M]ore than 20% of criminal aliens who were released on bond or otherwise not
kept in custody throughout their deportation proceedings failed to appear for those
proceedings." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 104-48, at 2) (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 1716.
140 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)).
141 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 10 1-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)).
142 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000).
143 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1716 (citing Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)).
144 Id.
145 Id. (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
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meaning of § 1226(c).146 The Court acknowledged that aliens are entitled to
due process rights in deportation proceedings. 147 Yet the Court affirmed its
century-old ruling that deportation hearings "would be in vain if those
accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true
character."'
148
The Court evaluated its opinions in Carlson v. Landon 149 and Reno v.
Flores.5 ° Carlson supported the Court's position in Demore because the
Communist aliens were detained as they awaited their deportation
proceedings without any sort of individual bond hearing.' 5' The Flores
Court also rejected due process challenges of juvenile aliens held in custody
by the INS pending their deportation proceedings. 52 The Court upheld the
constitutionality of this detention and the agency's policy of only releasing
detained juveniles to the care of certain adults, including parents and legal
guardians. 1
53
ii. The Court Distinguished Zadvydas v. Davis
The Court distinguished the recent Zadvydas v. Davis decision which
prohibited indefinite detention of removable aliens, and allowed detainment
only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal.
54
First, the aliens in Zadvydas were ones for whom deportation was "no
longer practically attainable," and so detention could not serve its asserted
immigration purpose. 55 In contrast, the aliens in Demore were deportable
criminal aliens pending their removal proceedings. 156 The Court found that
based on this difference in removal status, the government's detention of
the aliens under § 1226 could increase the likelihood of meeting the
immigration goal of successful deportation. 15
7
Second, while the detention period facing the aliens in Zadvydas was
indefinite, the detention for Kim and similarly situated LPRs was of a
shorter duration.' 58  The Court referenced statistics suggesting that in
146 Id. at 1717.
147 Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).
148 Id. (quoting Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)).
149 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
150 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
151 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1718 (citing Carlson, 342 U.S. at 524).
152 Id. at 1719 (citing Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)).
153 Id. (citing Flores, 507 U.S. at 297).
154 Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001)).
155 Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
156 Id. at 1720.
157 Id.
158 Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91).
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eighty-five percent of the cases in which an alien is held pursuant to §
1226(c), removal proceedings are generally concluded within forty-seven
days, with the remaining fifteen percent of the cases, in which the alien
appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge, averaging four months.
59
The Court acknowledged the longer than average duration of Kim's
detention, which had lasted six months.'
60
5. The Majority Concluded Kim was Lawfully Detained
The Court held that detention during removal proceedings is
constitutionally permissible, relying on Carlson and Flores.6 ' The Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit, emphasizing that Kim was a criminal alien who
had conceded his deportability, and who would only be detained for a
limited period before his removal proceedings. 1
62
B. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent 163 joined in the majority opinion to uphold federal
jurisdiction in the case, but disagreed with the majority on the merits of the
case. 164 The dissent observed that the basic liberty from physical
confinement is central to due process rights and must be afforded to
LPRs.'65 The INS never contended that the detention of Kim was necessary
to ensure that he would appear for his removal hearing or to protect the
community from danger.' 66 In fact, the INS released Kim finding that he
was not a threat, and that any risk of flight could be eliminated by a bond of
$5000. 167
' Id. at 1720-21 (citing Brief for the Petitioners at 39-40, Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct.
1708 (2003) (No. 01-1491)).
160 Id. at 1721.
161 Id. at 1721-22.
162 Id. at 1722.
163 For the purposes of this discussion, Justice Souter's opinion will be referred to as the
dissent. Although Justices Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg, concur with the majority opinion
on the jurisdiction issue, the analysis in this Note focuses only on the dissenting portion of
their opinion.
164 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1727 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined in the opinion. Justice Breyer authored a separate
dissent on the merits arguing that if Kim's legal arguments were not insubstantial nor
brought for purpose of delay, he was entitled to a bond hearing. Id. at 1746-47 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165 Id. at 1727 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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1. Kim's Rights to Remain in the United States are in Force Until He is
Under a Final Order of Removal
The dissent first argued that the majority opinion mistakenly suggested
that Kim conceded his removability. 168 Kim could not request relief from
removal until he came before an immigration judge.' 69 At the time that
Kim filed his habeas corpus petition, he had not yet been provided with an
initial hearing on the substantive issue of removability before an
immigration court.1 70  Furthermore, had Kim claimed that he was not
deportable, the district court would likely have dismissed Kim's claim,
finding that it was unexhausted.17' Finally, Kim could continue to claim the
benefit of his status as a LPR until a final order of removal was entered.1
72
The dissent next reviewed the legal protections granted to LPRs,
including the heightened due process protection they receive over other
aliens. 173  LPRs have the opportunity to create a permanent life in the
United States by developing economic, familial, and social ties equal to
those of a citizen. 174
2. Mandatory Detention Under § 1226(c) Does Not Fulfill a Necessary
Governmental Purpose
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, a potentially lengthy detention must
fulfill a necessary governmental purpose.175  Kim invoked the Court's
consistent decisions that "the claim of liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment is at its strongest when government seeks to detain an
individual."' 176 Due process requires that a detainee be given an individual
determination for the detainment as well as an opportunity to challenge the
reason for his commitment.177 The government could not avoid the Due
Process Clause by categorically selecting a group of people for
confinement, as done by § 1226(c), and denying members of the class any
opportunity to contest their detainment.
78
168 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 Id. at 1727-28 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 1728, 1730 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173 Id. at 1728 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175 Id. at 1731 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177 Id. at 1732-33 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178 Id. at 1733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Zadvydas decision supports an individualized review of Kim's
confinement. 79 Kim had an even stronger claim than the alien in Zadvydas,
who had already been issued a final removal order.'80 The constitutional
limitations of Congress's power to remove aliens should apply more strictly
to aliens such as Kim in that:
Government's justification for detaining individuals like Zadvydas and Ma, who had
no right to remain in this country and were proven flight risks and dangers to
society... is certainly stronger (and at least no weaker) than its interest in detaining a
lawful permanent resident who has not been shown (or even claimed) to be either a
flight risk or a threat to the community.
18 1
Aliens in removal proceedings have an additional interest in avoiding
detainment in order to develop and present their case against
removability.182
The dissent compared the "stark contrast to the total absence of
custody review" in Kim's case to the rights provided to removable aliens
under Zadvydas, including "the right to a hearing, to representation, and to
consideration of facts bearing on risk of flight, including criminal history,
evidence of rehabilitation, and ties to the United States." 8 3  Such
protections are not extended solely to aliens under a final order of removal,
but under 8 U.S.C. § 1536, Congress has made similar provisions granting
release hearings for those aliens charged with being foreign terrorists. 184
The majority's reliance on the Senate Report'8 5 as basis for
justification of a class-wide confinement without exception was
problematic for several reasons.' 86 For example, the Senate Report failed to
distinguish between alien groups, and the INS statistics regarding flight risk
reflected that decisions to release aliens were based solely on availability of
beds within the particular regions.' 8 7  The dissent cited to a study188
conducted at the request of the INS, finding that supervised release of
criminal aliens significantly decreased the potential for flight risk.
89
179 Id. at 1733-34 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180 Id. at 1734 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
... Id. at 1738-39 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182 Id. at 1734 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183 Id. at 1735 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 Id. at 1736-37 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'8' S. REP. No. 104-48 (1995).
186 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1739 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187 Id. (Souter, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188 VERA INST. OF JUST., TESTING CMTY SUPERVISION FOR THE INS: AN EVALUATION OF
THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, at ii, 33, 36 (2000).
189 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1740 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The dissent disagreed with the majority's claim that mandatory
detention under § 1226(c) is generally much shorter in duration than that in
Zadvydas.190  The statistics cited by the majority regarding length of
detention demonstrate that the vast majority of cases involve aliens who do
not raise any challenge to deportation.191 However, LPRs represent the
alien group most likely to present substantial challenges to deportation,
which then result in lengthy proceedings. 192 Even if the average length of
detention is shorter for aliens such as Kim than those aliens in Zadydas, this
does not provide a "legitimate answer to the due process claim to
individualized treatment and hearing."
' 193
Finally, Demore does not implicate the government's unquestionable
power to detain aliens in order to prevent flight or threat to the
community.194 Rather, the issue presented was whether such a power could
be used to detain a still lawfully permanent resident alien without reason,
and without opportunity to oppose it.' 95  Due process forbids such a
"blanket rule" allowing this confinement.
96
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court reached an erroneous conclusion in Demore.
First, the Court's holding was inconsistent with its recent decision in
Zadvydas. Curiously, the Court protected the due process rights of aliens
under final orders of removal in Zadvydas, but neglected to do so for aliens
who have not yet been found deportable. The government's rationale for
mandatory detention is less reasonable for criminal aliens such as Kim than
it is for aliens already under a final order of removal. Furthermore, the
Court's opinion serves to undermine the high status reserved for LPRs in
the United States. Finally, by adopting § 1226 in response to INS
disorganization, Congress chose to strip individuals of their due process
rights, as opposed to holding the INS accountable for its incompetence.
The Court's decision to ignore evidence suggesting that the government
could achieve its goal of ensuring the appearance of criminal aliens through
less restrictive means furthers this violation of personal liberty. Congress
should act to reverse this unnecessary infringement on the rights of LPRs
190 Id. at 1741 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194 Id. at 1746 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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through legislation requiring individual bond hearings and a supervised
release program for appropriate aliens.
A. IN DEMORE, THE SUPREME COURT REACHED A RULING
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS RECENT DECISION IN ZADVYDAS
1. The Protections Afforded to the Aliens in Zadvydas Should Also
Safeguard the Aliens in Demore
Similar to the aliens in Zadvydas, Kim is a LPR in the United States,
and is therefore protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment from infringements upon his right to liberty from unwanted
restraint. These LPRs are entitled to be free from arbitrary or capricious
detainment. 197 However, an important distinction exists between the aliens
in Zadvydas and Demore that supports the argument that those aliens in the
latter group deserve even greater protection than those in the former. As
noted by the dissent in Zadvydas, prior to the determination to remove an
alien, the alien, by virtue of his presence in the United States, has an interest
in remaining.198 In the same way, aliens like Kim who have not even
appeared for their removal hearing, have an interest in remaining in the
United States. Unlike those aliens who have had an opportunity to appear
in a removal hearing, have argued their case to remain, and have been
ordered removed, aliens like Kim have not yet lost their right to remain in
the country.
Similar to the aliens in Zadvydas, Kim and other aliens awaiting their
removal hearings could potentially be detained for indefinite periods. The
statutory language did not impose a fixed time limit for the detainment of
aliens either prior to or after a removal determination. For aliens such as
Kim who choose to exercise their right to appeal the restriction of their
liberties, the detention will most certainly be lengthy. In Zadvydas, the
Court required the government to release an alien under a final removal
order after having been detained for six months, asserting that Congress
previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for longer than six
months. 99 In comparison, Kim was finally provided an individualized
bond determination after being detained for six months, which was still
prior to his deportation hearing. As in Zadvydas where the Court found that
the aliens should not be unduly penalized because the government could not
remove them in a timely manner, the aliens awaiting their removal
197 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'99 Id. at 701.
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proceedings should not be punished for exercising their constitutional right
to appeal the government's actions.
The Zadvydas Court rejected the government's detention of criminal
aliens for the purpose of protecting the community without strong
procedural protection for the aliens. In Zadvydas, the Court noted that the
aliens themselves bore the burden of demonstrating that they did not impose
a threat to the community or constitute significant flight risks, and were not
protected with adequate judicial review.200  Correspondingly, aliens like
Kim are not afforded a single opportunity to prove the unreasonableness of
their detention. Section 1226(c)(2) provides a pre-removal hearing release
only for those aliens in a witness protection program. Notwithstanding the
aliens in witness protection programs, the government offers no procedural
protections for the due process rights of criminal aliens.
The dissent in Zadvydas considered the procedural safeguards for
aliens under deportation orders to demonstrate that they are not flight risks
or threats to their communities. 2 1 Although it found adequate safeguards
for the liberty rights of these aliens, the dissent cautioned against the
202
continued detainment of aliens without access to such protections.
Certainly, the dissent's warning applies to the situation of aliens who have
not yet surrendered their right to remain in the country and who are being
detained without consideration for release.
2. The Government Did Not Have a Sufficiently Strong Justification to
Detain the Aliens in Demore
Both Zadvydas and Demore involved aliens subject to detention
without individualized consideration of the necessity of their detainment.
The Zadvydas Court addressed this procedural failure and asserted that with
detention in the context of a civil proceeding, the government must proffer
a sufficiently strong special justification to support its decision.203  The
reasonableness of the detention should be considered chiefly in terms of the
statute's basic aim. While in Zadvydas the Court found that the statutory
purpose was to ensure the presence of the alien at the time of the removal,
in Demore the Court viewed a principle goal of § 1226(c) as to make certain
200 Id. at 692 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1) (2001) (providing that aliens, including
criminal aliens, ordered removed may appeal their detention and be ordered released if
shown that their release will not pose a danger to the community or that they do not
constitute a significant flight risk)).
201 Id. at 722-23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 690.
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that the alien would be present for the removal proceedings.0 4 Thus,
reasonable justification for detainment would be predicated upon the
likelihood that an alien would appear for his removal hearing.
Without an individualized determination of flight risk, however, the
government cannot assume that detention is required for aliens prior to their
deportation hearing. Certain criminal aliens would appear for their hearings
without being subjected to a severe restraint on their freedom. For
205
example, many LPRs have established strong ties to their communities.
Many have families living in the United States.20 6 These aliens have
considerable interests in cooperating with the government and fighting for
the right to remain in the country. It would be unreasonable, in
consideration of the statutory aim, to detain an immigrant who would
appear for his hearing without confinement. It becomes less reasonable still
for the government to require detention of such aliens when it releases
aliens like those in Zadvydas who have already been ordered deported.
These aliens under orders of removal have little incentive to cooperate with
the government. They have lost their right to stay in the United States and
have exhausted their right to due process on this issue. In contrast, the
Demore decision allows detention for LPRs with their right to remain in the
United States intact and with an interest in cooperating with the
government, but at the same time upholds the release of criminal aliens with
no right to stay in the country and with much less interest in complying
with the government.
B. IN DECIDING TO UPHOLD § 1226(C), THE COURT UNDERMINES THE
HIGH STATUS RESERVED FOR LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS
The decision upholding mandatory detention for criminal LPRs
pending their removal hearing undermines the high status reserved for
LPRs such as Kim in the United States. The United States has always been
a nation open to immigrants, and to this day the new immigrant population
continues to grow in proportion to the country's overall populace. During
the 1990s, more than thirteen million people moved to the United States,
averaging more than one million immigrants per year, including between
700,000 and 900,000 LPRs per year.20 7 By 2000, the Census measured the
204 Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2003) (indicating that the other main purpose
of§ 1226(c) is to protect the public from danger); S. REP. No. 104-48, at 32 (1995).
205 RANDY CAPPS ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE NEW NEIGHBORS: A USER'S GUIDE TO
DATA ON IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. COMMUNITIES 7 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/
url.cfm?ID=310844.
206 Id. at 9, fig.4.
207 Id. at 4, 8.
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immigrant population to be thirty-one million, or eleven percent of the total
United States population.08 LPRs make up the largest group of immigrants
in the United States, about one-third of all immigrants.20 9
As explained above, LPRs enjoy the rights to work, attend school,
reside permanently, and apply for citizenship. 210  These rights extend to
LPRs until a final order of removal is entered. 2" LPRs, as opposed to
temporary, nonimmigrant aliens, are taxed on their worldwide income.
1 2
Male LPRs between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six must register for
selective service.213 LPRs are eligible for naturalization after three to five
years following receipt of their legal residence documentation in the United
States.214
Many LPRs have lived in the United States for years and have
relatives who are also LPRs and citizens of the country. Almost all LPRs
are "sponsored" by close family members or employers upon entrance into
the country.215 For example, in fiscal year 2000, of the 850,000 immigrants
who attained legal permanent residence, 100,000 were sponsored by an
employer, and the majority of the remainder achieved the LPR status based
on family reunification.216
LPRs with strong familial ties in the United States have compelling
reasons to appear for their removal proceedings. Eighty-five percent of
immigrant families with children are mixed citizen-status families (families
in which at least one parent is a noncitizen and one child is a citizen). 21 7
For children eighteen and younger, one out of five was the child of an
immigrant parent in 2000.218 Given that LPRs form the largest group of
immigrants, many of the children born to immigrants are born to LPRs. It
can be expected, therefore, that such aliens appreciate the opportunity to
present their case to remain in the country.
208 Id. at 8 (citing Census 2000) (noting that this number includes both legal and
undocumented immigrants).
209 Id. at 9-10.
210 Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 528 (9th Cir. 2001).
211 Id.
212 Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1728-29 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
213 Id. at 1729.
214 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 205, at 9, fig.4.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 10.
217 MICHAEL FIX ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN
THE UNITED STATES (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410227.
218 THE URBAN INST., CHECK POINTS: DATA RELEASES ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES
(2000), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/CP_000911 .pdf
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LPRs contribute in many positive ways to the country. As the length
of their stay in the country increases, immigrant residents achieve greater
social and economic status.219 For instance, homeownership by LPRs
increases with time spent in the United States.220 Immigrants also start up
eighteen percent of all small businesses.21 Immigrants as a group earn
$240 billion a year and contribute $90 billion in taxes. 22 2 In comparison to
the native-born population, immigrants are more likely to be employed,
start new businesses, and save more of their income.223
LPRs who are not flight risks or dangerous to their community are
severely impacted by mandatory detention, whether or not they would be
later ordered to deport. One study found that those LPRs with significant
ties to the community are more likely to appear for their removal
hearings.22 4 The study also revealed that many of the LPRs who would be
eligible for a release program are ultimately permitted to remain in the
country. 225 Thus, the LPRs who are most likely to comply with the removal
proceedings are the same ones who make the greatest contributions to their
communities and who are most likely to remain in the country. By
indiscriminately forcing detention upon these LPRs, the government
unnecessarily deprives them from associating within their communities
among their families and friends. The LPRs that the court determines to
deport are deprived of the opportunity to prepare themselves for their
potential removal; these LPRs are prematurely disconnected from their
loved ones and communities.
While in detention, LPRs are restricted from participating in the
workforce and economy. Many aliens have had jobs or businesses in the
United States, but while detained cannot continue their work or make final
arrangements if they are deported. The ramifications of detention extend to
the aliens' communities and potentially the United States workforce and
economy. In upholding the blanket mandatory detention provision of
§ 1226(c), the Court demoralized those LPRs who most likely have made
significant contributions to the United States and have family who will
continue to reside in the United States.
219 CAPPS ET AL., supra note 205, at 7.
220 Id. at 6.
221 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS AsS'N (AILA), FIVE IMMIGRATION MYTHS
EXPLAINED (2003), at http://www.aila.org/contentViewer.aspx?bc= 17,142.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 188, at 7.
225 Id. at 37 (finding that forty percent of the released aliens in their study were later
permitted to stay in the United States).
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C. IN FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD A REASONABLE
PURPOSE TO DETAIN CRIMINAL ALIENS, THE COURT PERMITTED
THE RESTRICTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AS A SOLUTION TO
GOVERNMENT INEFFICIENCY
The Court accepted the government's rationale for mandatory
detention as a means to compensate for its own inefficiency and lack of
resources. 6  It rejected information suggesting that detention is
unnecessary in all cases of criminal aliens.227 The Demore Court upheld
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) for the purposes of assuring that
criminal aliens appear for their removal hearings as well as to protect the
public from potential criminal activity by the aliens.228 It found support for
detention pursuant to these rationales in Senate Report 104-48 (Senate
Report) which led to the enactment of § 1226(c) in 1996. 229 The Senate
Report highlighted that prior to the enactment of § 1226, a low percentage
of non-detained criminal aliens appeared for their removal hearings and
criminal aliens often committed more crimes before being deported.2 30 The
Senate Report documented numerous INS incompetencies contributing to
the low appearance rate.231 The Court acknowledged that when Congress
enacted § 1226, the INS had never tested individualized bond
determinations under optimal conditions.232
The Court improperly discounted the INS-commissioned study
conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice, which found that with supervised
release, a greater percentage of criminals appear for their removal
hearings. 233 In neglecting to apply the findings of the Vera Study, the Court
incorrectly found that the government proffered reasonable justification for
the mandatory detention of criminal aliens such as Kim.
1. The Court Approved the Congressional Enactment of§ 1226 in Response
to the INS' Severely Inefficient Operations and Inadequate Resources
The Demore Court agreed that the government had reasonable
justification to detain criminal aliens without an individual assessment
based upon the information presented in the Senate Report. The Senate
Report revealed that prior to the time that Congress enacted § 1226 in 1996,
226 Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1714-16 (2003).
227 Id. at 1719.
228 Id. at 1711.
229 Id. at 1715 (citing S. REP. No. 104-48 (1995)).
230 S. REP. No. 104-48, at 31-32.
231 Id. at 2-4.
232 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1720.




the INS was operating with inadequate resources and severe inefficiency.
The Senate Report stated that the INS was unable to "even identify most of
the criminal aliens eligible for deportation. 235  While the Court
acknowledged that § 1226(c) compensated for the disorganization of the
INS, it nevertheless agreed that the restriction of individual liberties was an
appropriate solution to the problem.
Prior to the passage of § 1226(c), the INS decisions to release criminal
aliens on bond were influenced principally by the agency's lack of
resources, specifically the "chronic lack of detention space" available to the
INS.236 At the time of the report, the INS had approximately 3500 detention
beds available in the entire country. 237 The lack of detention resources put
tremendous pressure on the INS to release, rather than confine, criminal
aliens.2 38 The Senate Report suggested that over twenty percent of non-
detained criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal hearings. 39
Moreover, once released on bond, the INS was again encumbered by
inadequate resources in terms of its capability to monitor the criminal
aliens. The INS made limited efforts to locate and apprehend criminal
aliens failing to appear.240 The Senate Report described the INS record-
keeping system as "outdated and seriously flawed.",24' The agency did not
maintain accurate records of the criminal aliens' basic information and
often had difficulty locating aliens to issue their final orders of removal.242
Instead of requiring the INS to streamline its operations when
confronted with the severe disorganization, Congress restricted the rights of
criminal aliens. In upholding the mandatory detention imposed upon all
criminal aliens, the Court further promoted the violation of individual
liberties to counter the failings of the government.
2. The Court Incorrectly Rejected the Important Findings of the Vera
Report Demonstrating that Under Efficient Programs, Released Criminal
Aliens Will Consistently Report for Their Removal Hearings
In Demore, the government argued that mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c) was necessary to the appearance of criminal aliens at their
234 S. REP. No. 104-48.
235 Id. at 2.
236 Id. at 23.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 2.
240 Id. at 18.
241 Id. at 14.
242 Id. at 2, 15.
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removal hearings.243 While the government supported this rationale with
data indicating that the INS could not manage the released criminal aliens,
the Court completely rejected findings that eligible criminal aliens would
appear for removal hearings under a less costly release program.244 A study
conducted at the request of the INS by the Vera Institute for Justice found
that a supervised release program for eligible criminal aliens pending their
removal hearings served as a less costly and equally effective alternative to
detainment.245 Unfortunately, the INS cannot implement a supervised
release program due to the statutory restraint on the discretion of the agency
to release criminal aliens into such a program.246
In ignoring the significance of the Vera Institute's findings, the Court
averred that the Due Process Clause did not require the least burdensome
means to achieve a statutory goal of detention. 47 However, as in Zadvydas
where the Court could not find a reasonable justification for detention when
removal seems a remote possibility, the government's need to detain
criminal aliens to assure their appearance at a removal hearing can not be
reasonably justified for those aliens who would appear without detainment.
The Court therefore ignored evidence that certain criminal aliens would be
unjustifiably detained by mandatory detention under § 1226(c).
i. The Vera Report Demonstrated that a Supervised Release Program for
Eligible Criminal Aliens Facilitated a High Appearance Rate at
Removal Hearings
The report issued by the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera Report)
reviewed the findings of the Appearance Assistance Program (AAP) as
designed and implemented by the Vera Institute.248 The criminal aliens
participating in the AAP were placed under intensive supervision,
signifying that as a condition of release the aliens were expected to report
regularly to supervision officers in person and by phone. 249 The AAP staff
monitored the criminal aliens' whereabouts and risk of flight and provided
them with information about their obligations to comply with the law and
243 Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2003).
244 Id. at 1720.
245 VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 188, at i-iii.
246 S. REP. No. 104-48, at 12.
247 Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1720.
248 VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 188. The AAP began in February 1997 in New York
City. Id. at 1. The program participants included aliens from three groups: asylum seekers,
criminal aliens, and undocumented workers apprehended at work sites. Id. The AAP




the consequences for noncompliance. 250 The researchers established certain
criteria to determine the suitability of the criminal aliens for release
including: the strength of their family and community ties, their appearance
rate in prior legal proceedings, their eligibility to apply for legal relief, and
the potential impact on public safety as determined by their rap sheets.25  If
an alien was not qualified for legal relief, the program considered the
strength of the alien's ties to the community and other equities both in the
United States and in home country. 2  Prior to an alien's release, the
researchers verified the alien's address and contact information and
required a designated guarantor who agreed to take moral, not legal or
financial, responsibility for the alien. 3
After conducting a three year assessment of the program, the Vera
Institute discovered that ninety-four percent of the supervised criminal
aliens appeared for their removal hearings.2 54 The researchers compared the
results of the criminal aliens participating in the AAP to the results of a
comparison group of criminal aliens released on bond or parole without
supervision, finding that the comparison group appeared for their removal
hearings seventy-one percent of the time.255 The Vera Report contrasted
these statistics with the seventy-eight percent appearance rate of felony
defendants released from detention before criminal trials on bail and
recognizance. 256 Finally, the Vera Report found that forty percent of the
criminal aliens released under the AAP were ultimately allowed to remain
in the United States.257
The Vera Report discerned three factors positively affecting the aliens'
compliance within the removal proceedings: community and family ties in
the United States, the aliens' representation by counsel, and participation in
AAP. 58 When surveyed for their motivation to comply, the aliens cited
that the AAP assisted them in making more informed decisions by
explaining the removal process, ways to seek attorneys, legal options, and
consequences for failing to appear.25 9 The aliens further explained that they
250 Id.
251 Id. at 13.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 3.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 4, n.5.
257 Id. at 37.




were reluctant to disappoint the program staff who had treated them with
respect.26°
The Vera Report highlighted that for criminal aliens supervised release
was more cost-effective than detention.261 The cost of releasing a criminal
alien on bond was not only the least expensive alternative, but also resulted
in the lowest continuous rate of appearance at removal proceedings.262 The
Vera Institute suggested that the best choice for the management of criminal
aliens awaiting their removal proceedings would be an intensive
supervision program until the final order of removal is or is not entered, and
then detainment upon an order of removal.263
The Vera Report confirmed that the statutory aim of ensuring the
appearance of criminal aliens at their removal hearings may be met without
mandatory detention. Under a program of supervised release, eligible
criminal aliens will maintain their right to remain in the country without
excessive limitation upon this right up until the point that they are afforded
a hearing on their removal. If at that time, after having an opportunity to
present their case to remain in the United States, an immigration judge
determines that the criminal alien be removed, the alien no longer has an
unrestricted right to be in the country.
ii. Congress Should Enact Legislation Demanding an Alternative to
Mandatory Detention in Order to Reduce Costs Both in Terms of
Government Resources and Individual Liberties
In 1998, the INS publicly asserted through its commissioner, Doris
Meissner, that it would like an amendment to the requirement under § 1226
of mandatory detention for criminal aliens to allow for more agency
discretion in its handling of the aliens.2 4 Commissioner Meissner stated
that even though the INS had received more funding and had considerably
increased its detention capacity, the agency nevertheless could not
accommodate the detainment of all criminal aliens as required under
§ 1226(c).265 Significantly, Commissioner Meissner argued that for some
260 Id.
26! Id. at 8, tbl.1 (finding based on cost through the final hearing that the cost per
criminal alien detained was $4575 and the cost per criminal alien detained and then
supervised was $3871).
262 Id. (finding the cost was $238 through the final hearing, but only with a seventy-seven
percent appearance rate).
263 Id.
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of the aliens, detention served no purpose under the statute.266 In fact, both
the Department of Justice and INS admitted that § 1226 goes too far. 267
Ironically, by enacting § 1226(c), the legislature chose to limit the liberty
rights of aliens in response to the inefficiencies of the INS, while the INS
contracted with the Vera Institute for Justice to develop a supervised release
program so as to prevent unnecessary detention.
Since 1998, the immigration policies and procedures of the United
States have undergone vast transformation. In response to the terrorism of
September 11, 2001, the government has allocated more resources to the
management of immigration.268 The government has acted to better
organize and restructure immigration services resulting in the abolishment
of the INS and creation of the new Homeland Security Department. It is an
opportune time for Congress to reverse its history of shielding government
inefficiency in immigration at the cost of the rights of aliens who lawfully
reside in the United States. Congress should rescind the mandatory
detention provision of § 1226 and return the discretion to the immigration
agency for individual release determinations. As recommended by the INS
and the Vera Report, Congress should endorse individual bond hearings and
supervised release programs to protect aliens from unnecessary restraint at a
relatively low cost to the government.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the provision of
the INA limiting judicial review of the Attorney General's discretion for the
detention or release of any alien did not preclude the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction to grant habeas relief; and (2) Congress did not offend due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment in requiring that aliens pending
removal hearings be detained pursuant to the no-bail provision under
§ 1226(c) of the INA.
The Demore Court, however, ruled inconsistently with its recent
opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis. The Court succeeded in damaging the high
status reserved for legal permanent aliens in the United States. The Court
improperly agreed that the government could reasonably restrict the rights
of individual aliens as a solution for government incompetence. During this
era of reform in the country's immigration services and policies, Congress
should revoke the mandatory detention provision of § 1226 and instead
266 Id.
267 Brief for the Respondents at 27, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No. 99-
7791).
268 See, e.g., The Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 2003).
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enact legislation that requires both government efficiency and protection for
individual liberties.
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